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South Korea in Africa – From arbitrary foreign  
policy to win-win ideology 
 
Introduction 
South Korea’s involvement in Africa started with the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Cote 
d’Ivoire in 1961. It took some time before the first 
embassy of an African country was installed in Seoul 
(Gabon in 1975), but gradually more followed. Alt-
hough diplomatic relations with several African coun-
tries were forged in those early years, Africa did not 
play an intricate role in South Korea’s international 
affairs during the Cold War. South Korea’s primary 
goal in establishing diplomatic relations was its own 
political recognition. The first state visit by a Korean 
president to Africa in 1982 was a prime example of 
this policy. President Chun (1980-1988) visited Nigeria, 
Gabon, Senegal, and Kenya to gather support for 
South Korea’s admission to the United Nations and to 
be recognized as a state. South Korea scrambled to get 
as many African nations on its side as possible, fearing 
that the wealthier North might beat it to the punch. 
This led to an irregular policy of responding to the 
whims of African leaders, rather than a systematic 
diplomatic approach.  
After recognition of both the North and the South 
by the UN in 1991, South Korea’s interest in Africa 
waned. The number of South Korean embassies and 
consulates in Africa fell as it shifted its focus to the 
newly independent countries of the former Soviet 
Bloc. It was not until the mid-2000s that South Korea 
began to take diplomatic relations with Africa serious-
ly again, resulting in the second state visit by a Korean 
president to Africa in 2006. On his visit to Egypt, Nige-
ria, and Algeria, President Roh (2003-2008) discussed 
several trade and investment deals and pledged to 
increase Korea’s official development assistance (ODA) 
to Africa threefold by 2008. Named Korea’s Initiative 
for Africa’s Development, these agreements kicked off 
Korea’s resources diplomacy. Together with the initia-
tion of two Korea-Africa Forums in 2006 – the triennial 
Korea-Africa Forum led by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), 1 and the biennial Korea 
Africa Economic Cooperation Conference (KOAFEC) led 
by the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) – it 
helped to systematically formalize and institutionalize 
Korea-Africa relations. 
Former President Roh’s successors built on this 
policy, particularly stressing that South Korea and 
                                                 
1  At the time of writing, the trade part has been omitted 
and the name is now Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). 
Africa are engaged in a ‘win-win’ partnership, where-
by the former is deeply committed to contributing to 
the socio-economic development of the latter. Presi-
dent Lee Myung Bak’s administration (2008-2013) 
actively sought to build an extensive network of pro-
Korean policymakers, business leaders, and high-
ranking public officials in Africa, as a means of enhanc-
ing South Korea’s political and economic prestige. His 
official visit to Ethiopia in 2011 was presented as a 
concentrated effort to emphasize South Korea’s role 
as a development partner. The two sides signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding on industrial cooper-
ation in the textile and leather industries in which 
Korea vowed to share its substantial development 
knowledge and insights accumulated over the past 
half-century. Acting President Park Geun Hye (25 Feb-
ruary 2013-) has continued this policy by dispatching 
special envoys to Algeria, Benin, the DRC, Madagascar, 
Morocco, and Togo in August 2013 as a means of de-
veloping deeper ties with all parts of Africa. Further-
more, the presidents of Mozambique and Uganda 
visited South Korea in May and June 2013, respective-
ly, and President Park received the president of Cote 
d’Ivoire, resulting in the first ever bilateral meeting 
between the heads of state of the two countries. In 
January 2015, the Korea-Africa Future Strategy Center 
was founded to perform strategic research and build a 
professional network to facilitate the diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and commercial affairs of Korean organizations 
and businesses that are interested in Africa.  
 
Korea’s place in Africa 
As a resource-poor country, South Korea has a near 
total dependence on importing its energy and relies on 
fossil fuels for a staggering 85.6 per cent of its energy 
consumption. With 50 per cent of Korea’s oil import 
coming from only two countries (Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates), it is not surprising that South 
Korea worries about its energy security. Combined 
with an 80 per cent reliance on food imports, South 
Korea’s interest in Africa as a source for food and 
diversification of its energy sources is evident. South 
Korea also looks towards Africa because its own do-
mestic market has become saturated. This has result-
ed in Korea’s economy becoming increasingly export-
oriented with the heavy industrial sector playing a 
crucial part. Africa’s emerging market, with its press-
ing need for major infrastructural development and its 
growing middle class, could potentially have a big role 
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in the growth of the Korean economy in the future. 
Lastly, South Korea has aspirations to be recognized as 
a prominent global power and therefore aims to gain a 
firm foothold among other global competitors, in what 
Korean policymakers see as a new ‘scramble for Afri-
ca.’ 
As a relative newcomer, however, South Korea 
faces a number of significant obstacles in gaining a 
firm political and economic position in Africa. In terms 
of securing food and energy resources, South Korea 
has found that its own relatively modest economic 
resources and political power are no match for those 
of China, the United States, and some European and 
Gulf powers. Furthermore, because of their hunger for 
Africa’s resources, South Korean firms have made 
some crucial mistakes, which caused South Korea to 
suffer considerable reputational damage. The two 
most prominent examples of this are the Korean Na-
tional Oil Company’s (KNOC) deal in Nigeria and Dae-
woo’s embarrassing land-lease experience in Mada-
gascar. In Nigeria, the KNOC was awarded the explora-
tion rights to two offshore blocks by the then presi-
dent of Nigeria, Obasanjo, but these were rescinded 
by his successor in 2009 on the grounds that the bid-
ding process had been marred by irregularities and 
that the KNOC had failed to fulfil its contractual obliga-
tions. In Madagascar, the government awarded a 99-
year land lease to Daewoo Logistics for almost half of 
Madagascar’s cultivable area. The deal aroused such 
controversy in Madagascar (and abroad) that it result-
ed in violent protests and ended in a military coup, 
ousting then President Ravalomanana. His successor 
promptly nullified the agreement with Daewoo. 
Despite this negative publicity, South Korea still 
has a reputation for being a model of development for 
Africa. Just like many African countries, South Korea 
has been through colonial rule, civil war, famine, and 
poverty. Under even worse conditions than many 
African countries, South Korea achieved industrializa-
tion and economic growth in a short period of time, 
culminating in the country becoming a G20 member. 
Its successful economic development is cited as a 
typical example against the logic that attributes the 
underdevelopment in Africa to the legacy of colonial 
rule. Thus, South Korea’s development story is a com-
pelling one for many African nations.  
South Korea’s model of modernization is also par-
ticularly appealing to African nations because the 
country is a medium state, a former colony of a major 
power, and a nation that was never a dominant power 
in its history. In addition, the Korean model of “devel-
opment under dictatorship” (although not promoted 
as such by the Korean government) is used as an ex-
ample to prove that the democratization and human 
rights protection that are demanded by the West as 
preconditions for economic development are, in fact, 
not very relevant to economic growth. That is why 
especially those African countries under longstanding 
political leaders are very interested in South Korea's 
development experience; in particular, in the govern-
ment-led development model of Korea of the 1960-
70s, characterized by “industrialization” and the “New 
Community Movement” (Saemaeul Undong). This 
model, which sees rural development and moderniza-
tion as key to breaking the poverty cycle, is considered 
an example. 
Saemaeul Undong has already been exported to a 
number of African countries, including the DRC, 
Rwanda, and Uganda. Similarly, the Knowledge Shar-
ing Program (KSP), launched by the MOSF in 2004, is 
an initiative that encourages partner countries to 
adopt the same methods that have produced South 
Korea’s economic miracle. It is designed to share de-
velopment know-how, assisting partner countries and 
working towards lessening the knowledge divide. 
Another skill transfer program is the Korea-Africa Food 
and Agriculture Cooperation Initiative (KAFACI). Estab-
lished by South Korea’s Rural Development Admin-
istration, KAFACI regards food security, agricultural 
industrialization, and sustainability as key elements of 
Africa’s future prosperity. South Korean agricultural 
expertise is utilized to provide training and education 
for African agriculturalists. Many African countries are 
also eager to have technology exchanges with South 
Korea, a powerhouse in ICT, in such areas as e-
government and construction of wireless broadband 
networks. 
South Korea is aware that, if it is to be recognized 
as a prominent global power, it must increase its role 
in global peacekeeping operations (PKO). The Lee 
administration pledged to increase the size of South 
Korea’s PKO forces – which ranked 36th, although 
Seoul was the 10th largest donor to the UN at the time 
– to 2,000 by 2012, which would rank it 10th world-
wide. To reach that goal, South Korea has revised 
South Korean law to make PKO deployment easier and 
faster. The "Act on Participation in UN PKO" was en-
acted in 2010. This law allows the South Korean gov-
ernment and the UN to establish provisional agree-
ments on matters related to the deployment of about 
1,000 peacekeepers prior to the approval of the Na-
tional Assembly. At the time of writing, South Korea is 
active in PKOs in Liberia (UNMIL), South Sudan (UN-
MISS), Sudan-Darfur (UNAMID), Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), 
and West Sahara (MINURSO). 
 
Trade 
South Korea has been expanding its export to African 
countries rapidly over the last 20 years. According to 
the UN Comtrade database, in 2013 South Korea ex-
ported a total of US$15 million to Africa, more than 10 
times the volume in 1990. However, the relative share 
of African countries in South Korea’s export has re-
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mained somewhere between 2 and 4 per cent be-
tween 2001 and 2012. Its biggest exporting partner in 
Africa was Liberia (23 per cent), followed by South 
Africa (17 per cent) and Nigeria (10 per cent). Howev-
er, it is important to note that Liberia has a tremen-
dous amount of trade volume because South Korea, 
like other countries, applies a "Flag of convenience" 
business practice: Korean ships are registered as Libe-
rian to reduce operating costs and avoid regulations 
that would apply if the ships were registered as Kore-
an. So with Liberia excluded, South Africa is the big-
gest trade partner of South Korea.  
The number of South Korean companies currently 
engaged in the region remains far below the ambitions 
of the Korean government. The principal hurdle facing 
South Korean businesses is the difficulty that they 
encounter in identifying appropriate local clients. A 
prevailing lack of information concerning both poten-
tial local partners and business culture in African mar-
kets has been identified as a significant stumbling 
block by possible investors. In addition, South Korean 
businesses also grumble about widespread corruption 
and ineffective local administrations, both of which act 
as deterrents to conducting business in Africa. 
 
 
 
South Korea’s share in Africa’s export market is 
growing, yet still small; in 2013, 29 countries in Africa 
exported to South Korea, amounting to just 0.7 per 
cent of the total export of US$2.8 billion (down from 
1.45 per cent a year before). The biggest exporter was 
South Africa (44 per cent), followed by Egypt (25 per 
cent). The most important commodities included 
“Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc. (HS 27),” 
which amounted to 46 per cent, followed by iron and 
steel (HS 72) with 10 per cent.  
 
 
FDI 
South Korea’s investment in Africa has been increasing 
dramatically since 2005, but has not yet reached the 
level of its competitors. In 1987, Korea’s FDI outflow 
to Africa was a total of US$ 0.1 million, growing to 
more than US$ 350 million in 2013. Libya used to be 
one of the biggest receivers of FDI by South Korea, but 
its share dramatically dropped from US$ 13.6 million 
to a mere US$ 1.74 million due to its civil war and the 
collapse of the Qaddafi regime in 2011. After the civil 
war, South Korean enterprises, including Daewoo E&C, 
Shinhan E&C, and Hyundai E&C, tried to revive their 
construction projects for a time. However, due to 
continued fighting between factions in Libya, Korean 
companies decided to evacuate their personnel in 
2014 and the current situation of these projects is 
unknown.  
After the fall of Qaddafi, South Korea’s FDI policy 
shifted and in 2012 the biggest African FDI receiver 
was Madagascar (US$ 270.141 million) followed by 
Mozambique (US$ 22.949 million). The mining sector 
in these countries received the biggest investment. In 
Madagascar, a South Korean consortium consisting of 
the Korea Resources Corporation, Daewoo Interna-
tional, and STX, made an investment in the Ambatobe 
Nickel Mine, which has become commercially opera-
tional.  
 
ODA 
South Korea’s history of giving developmental aid 
dates back to 1987, when the Economic Development 
Cooperation Fund (EDCF) was established, which is 
managed by the Ministry of Finance. The EDCF’s first 
loan was made to Nigeria for its train car moderniza-
tion project. In 1991, the Korea International Coopera-
tion Agency (KOICA, managed by the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs) was established, a governmental agency 
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with a sole purpose to grant aid, building a regular 
assistance system for a more effective and systematic 
operation for South Korea’s Official Direct Aid (ODA). 
Because these two ministries manage ODA, South 
Korea’s ODA is often referred to as a “two-pillar sys-
tem.”  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: ODA organization overview 
 
 
Since the establishment of the EDCF, South Korea 
has typically used ODA as a lever to further the inter-
ests of the country’s companies, with the intention of 
securing favourable access to resources and tenders 
for major infrastructure projects. However, since 
South Korea became a member of the OECD Devel-
opment Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2010, this 
policy has increasingly been criticized by the other 
members. South Korea’s proportion of untied bilateral 
aid was 33 per cent at the time of entry to the DAC, 
significantly lower than the DAC average of 76 per 
cent. South Korea has come under increasing pressure 
to conform to the DACs standards to favour grants 
over loans, provide ODA to countries with very low 
levels of development, and to untie aid. In response, it 
has strived to untie 75 per cent of its bilateral aid by 
2015. Furthermore, Seoul is currently also reviewing 
its priority partner countries and planning to provide 
more aid to the least developed, most fragile countries 
(for example, Mali) in the coming years. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
Although South Korea started bilateral affairs with 
African nations solely for its own recognition as a 
state, over time it has developed a more thought out 
policy on African affairs. Having the reputation of 
being a model of development for Africa helps Korea 
in dealing with African nations, but its own relatively 
modest economic resources and political power are no 
match for its competitors. In order to increase its 
number of partners in Africa, Korea tries to market its 
win-win philosophy the best it can; selling its unique 
history to position itself as an equal partner instead of 
a potential colonizer. Although there is a genuine 
interest in doing business with Africa, it is still just a 
small percentage of Korea’s total trade. The 
knowledge gap in Korea concerning both potential 
local partners and business culture in African markets 
must be addressed before trade between Africa and 
Korea is able to flourish in the future.  
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Figure 3: Korea's FDI outflow to Africa 
(Million $) 
Korea's FDI
Outflow to
Africa
(Million $) 0
50
100
150
200
250
300
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
Figure 5: Korea's ODA net disbursement 
in Africa (Million $) 
Korea's
ODA Net
Disburse
ment in
Africa
(Million
$)
